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GOD AND PRIVACY
Margaret Falls-Corbitt and F. Michael McLain

Contemporary reflection about God which includes certain assumptions
raises for us the issue of God and privacy. Some philosophers believe that
there is an obligation to respect privacy grounded in our basic moral duty to
respect the autonomous choices of persons. If this is correct, and if it is correct
to think of God as one whose actions perfectly accord with moral duties, then
there is a prima facie case for thinking that God respects our privacy. We
explore this thesis by considering the most plausible objections to it, including matters of religious practice.

The issue of God and privacy arises from consideration of the contemporary
theistic conception of God as an all-powerful but "self-limiting" being who
chose to bring into being creatures with a significant freedom, a libertarian
freedom which creatures use to shape in part their destinies as they struggle
with the perils of moral choice. The virtue of this position is that it recognizes
that a God who creates significantly free choice and always allows its exercise
limits divine power. Since libertarian choice cannot both be free and determined, a God who always values autonomous choice will not use divine
power to override it. Some philosophers have placed logical limits on the
scope of divine omniscience as well; they have argued for such limits in the
case of the possible and future contingents. l But it is assumed by all that God
necessarily knows all truths about the past and present. In this essay we argue
that if God so values human freedom, then a very strong case can be made
that God also chooses to limit divine knowledge in a way that respects
privacy. That is, though God's knowledge of what is true could include every
innermost thought and feeling of each of us, God chooses instead to grant
humans the choice of self-disclosure.
Our argument to this effect employs a certain analysis of the value of
respect for privacy among humans and maintains that this value tells us
something about divine respect for privacy. In making this move from human
relationships to the divine-human relationship we make two assumptions
typically, but not un controversially, shared by those who maintain that God
is self-limiting and humans free. The first assumption is that God desires and
commands that we use our freedom to develop good moral character and to
cultivate relationships of love and trust with others and with God. 2 The second
assumption-presently more subject to debate-is that a proper explication
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of divine goodness includes reference to that which is morally good. 3 That
is, reflection on principles which morally bind human conduct legitimately
serves as a guide to the character of divine action, either because God
shares the duties which these principles detail 4 or because these principles
specify the moral value freely and unobligedly actualized out of divine
benevolence.

1
We begin our exploration of God and privacy with an account of the nature
of privacy and the moral basis for respecting it in human-to-human relationships. In proposing this account we assume a Kantian stance, accepting as
fundamental and absolute our obligation to respect the autonomy of persons.
"Privacy," as some use it, refers to the lack of information which others
have about one. Accordingly, the less information others have about an individual the more privacy that individual has. But this understanding of privacy
makes the notion of violating another's privacy difficult to understand. We
do not violate a friend's privacy by knowing great numbers of intimate details
she freely reveals to us; we do violate her privacy if instead we learn those
same details from surreptitiously reading her diary. In its important moral
sense "privacy" refers to our ability to control others' access to information about us, to the intimacies of our lives, to our thoughts, and to our
bodies. s
Of course, complete control seems impossible since any public contact may
inadvertently reveal information. For example, a student may only intend to
reveal a set of facts about his failed romantic relationship while, from both
the facts and body language, the teacher accurately surmises a history of
family problems and psychological trauma. What is important nonetheless is
that individuals retain control over when, where and to whom they make
explicit self-revelations and over the conditions under which they put themselves in a position which risks inadvertently providing information. The
student in the above example chose to risk a personal conversation with the
teacher.
We respect others' privacy, then, by allowing them to choose the circumstances in which they do or do not make or risk self-revelation. Respecting
the autonomy of others also has to do with respecting their choices, and so
a very important connection between respecting privacy and respecting autonomy is immediately apparent.
We are morally obligated to respect the autonomy of persons. Respecting
another's autonomy does not require that we let her do whatever she desires.
It does require that we not do to her whatever we desire irrespective of her
preferences, aims and intentions. We must allow her choices, especially her
well-informed decisions, to be centrally determinative of what happens to

GOD AND PRIVACY

371

her. In other words, that she chooses X is a prima facie reason for our allowing
her to do X and the fact that her doing X interferes with our plans or even
the plans of the majority is not a morally sufficient reason for denying her
the opportunity to do X. That X is morally wrong and fails to show respect
for the chooser's own autonomy or the autonomy of others is a morally
sufficient reason for such a denial. That a person does not want us to observe
his body, know his history or read his thoughts is a prima facie moral reason
for not doing these things. Respecting privacy, in other words, is a prima
facie duty derived from our fundamental duty to respect the autonomy of
persons. Yet it may conflict with and be overridden by some other prima facie
obligation also derived from our obligation to respect autonomy.
What does this conclusion regarding humans imply regarding God? Added
to the assumptions stated above regarding human and divine goodness, this
analysis of the moral value of privacy makes an initially strong case for the
position that God shows prima facie regard for our privacy by allowing us to
choose whether and when to make self-disclosure before God. Above we
assumed that a proper understanding of moral principles binding upon humans reveals also the character of divine activity towards humans either
because it discloses like duties for God or because it describes moral value
actualized by unobliged divine benevolence. On the "duty model," the above
moral analysis of privacy gives a very strong case for the view that God
acknowledges a divine prima facie moral duty to respect an individual's
choice not to disclose information to God. On the "benevolence model," the
analysis of privacy gives initially very strong reasons for believing that God,
out of freely chosen goodness, would require of Godself overriding reasons
to violate an individual's choice against self-disclosure. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to both of these versions as the position that God shows
prima facie regard for our privacy.
Our initial argument regarding God and privacy has been that a strong case
can be made for God's prima facie regard for our privacy, based on the
assumed view of divine goodness along with the derivation of a prima facie
duty to respect privacy from an absolute duty to respect autonomy. This gives
us only a prima facie regard for privacy because there may be circumstances
in which God's respecting an individual's privacy would conflict with some
other more stringent duty or more benevolent act also derived from God's
duty or benevolent intention to respect autonomy. In this essay we will not
investigate what other possibly conflicting duties might be involved, or what
would count as a morally sufficient reason for God not to respect an
individual's choice not to bring an idea, judgement, or feeling before God's
purview. Rather we shall explore and defend the initial argument for a strong
case for God's prima facie regard of human privacy. We do so by examining
a set of possible objections.
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We foresee three basic ways to challenge our initial argument. The first
two objections have in common the claim that despite the earlier assumption
regarding the likeness of human morality and divine activity, there just are
reasons in this case to deny the connection. The first argument along these
lines-objection (A), we will call it-would challenge our initial argument
on the ground that God's nature is such that, unlike humans, God can respect
our autonomy without respecting our privacy. The second-that is objection
(B)-would be that perhaps God's authority over us is such that, unlike fellow
humans, God is neither obligated nor benevolently determined to respect out
autonomy, and thus morally need not have prima facie regard for our privacy.
The third objection-(C)-would be to marshall such compelling reasons to
believe that God does, or ought to (in some sense other than that held by the
initial argument), know the inner recesses of human thought that this initial
case to the contrary is overridden.
In the remainder of this section and in section (3) we offer a response to
objection (A) and a three-part response to objection (B). In section (4) we
answer objection (C). We maintain that our responses to these criticisms
ultimately build a cumulative argument that strengthens the initial argument
for God's respect for privacy.
Objection A. Our initial argument maintains that respect for autonomy
requires prima facie regard for privacy. Yet, it might be objected that the
connection between autonomy and privacy in human affairs is due to the
corrupted nature of the creature which the Creator does not share. Our fellow
humans may trick us, keeping us uncertain of whether we are observed. They
may delight in abusing their knowledge about us; or they might intend to use
it well but lack the power or the knowledge to do so. For all these reasons,
human disrespect for privacy does threaten our ability to control our lives in
accordance with our choices. But, the objection continues, God's perfection
protects us from imagined misuse or abuse of divine knowledge about us.
God's omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and omniscience all mean that we
need not fear the malevolent use or bumbling abuse of our secrets. Additionally, God's omnipresence means that we are not in doubt as to when God
observes, namely always.
Reply to (A). We agree that the possible abuse of personal information is a
good reason to fear human disregard for privacy but not orthodox divine
omniscience. But the initial argument deriving respect for privacy from respect for autonomy did not depend on any contingent claims regarding what
happens when information about us is abused either accidentally or intentionally. The argument is rather that failure to respect an individual's choice to
withhold information about herself is, in and of itself, a failure to respect her
autonomy unless there are intervening morally relevant factors. Therefore,
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the impossibility that an all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful God will misuse
knowledge about us, does not make the moral duty to respect privacy any
less applicable to God.
God's omnipresence and the certainty of divine observation as compared
to uncertainty in the human case also would not make God's disregard for
our choice of privacy any less a disregard for our autonomy. For, it is not the
covert nature of a violation of privacy which makes if morally blameworthy.
That Winston, in Orwell's 1984, could trust the "Thought Police" to watch
and win in the end makes their access to his mind no less a violation of his
privacy or his autonomy. Again, it is the disruption of choice itself, not its
covert or overt nature, that makes the disregard for privacy prima facie a
violation of our autonomy and thus, in the absence of morally overriding
factors, morally wrong. 6
Objection (B). The first objection to our initial argument that there is a
connection between God's respect for autonomy and divine prima facie respect for privacy fails. A second line of attack would grant this connection
but deny that God has morally compelling grounds for respecting autonomy
such as bind our fellow humans. As an explanation for humans' obligation to
respect each others' autonomy the objector might claim that human-tohuman, each individual is her own proper moral authority only because every
human is morally fallible, and no adult human has a natural, uncontested
authority over another. Rather, authority must be gained through "freely"
entered into relationships such as citizen/state or teacher/student. God, by
comparison, is morally infallible, asking of us only what is truly good, and
has an uncontestable relationship to us as our Creator. As a result, his objection concludes, God has ultimate moral authority over us and our God-given
autonomy does not morally bind the divine nor compel divine respect.
Reply to (B)-part (i). We agree that God, considered abstractly as the
all-morally-wise creator, need not be seen as one who must respect our autonomy. In reply we will not attempt to deal with every aspect of the complex
issue of God and human autonomy. Our argument is that this abstract consideration of the issue overlooks the connection between respecting autonomy
and respecting the conditions for becoming an autonomous person. The purposes for us which we presumed above to be God-given show God's interest
in our becoming autonomous in at least the limited sense of our becoming
morally accountable beings of a certain kind. Our reply to (B), therefore, will
be that divine respect for privacy is necessary for us to become the autonomous persons required by God's purposes.
We, and most theists who posit God's creation of significantly free humans,
believe that God intends us to use our freedom to become responsible moral
agents capable of relationships of love and trust with others and with God.
Furthermore, God not only intends this for us but holds us accountable for
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becoming such. Granted God's moral authority over us, what if it is further
the case that we cannot become the kind of creatures God intends and holds
us accountable for becoming unless God respects our autonomy and privacy?
It then would follow, we believe, that for both moral and nonmoral reasons
God must show prima facie regard for human privacy. If divine respect for
privacy proves necessary for our becoming morally accountable beings who
can enter relationships of trust and love, a God who does not respect privacy
acts inconsistently, frustrating God's own purposes, and is morally flawed,
holding accountable creatures who, by God's own doing, cannot become what
they are commanded to become. Such a God would not be a maximally
perfect being.
We think the case for this connection between the supposed divine purpose
and divine respect for privacy is strong and we shall make it by first considering in section (3), part (ii) of our reply to (B), the detrimental effects which
human disregard for privacy has on moral development and on trust and
intimacy, crucial components of love. We then argue in (3), rely to (B)-part
(iii), that divine disregard for human privacy would be likely to have similar
detrimental effects and hence would be subject to the moral criticism that
God holds us accountable for what God makes it impossible for us to achieve.
If sound, our reasoning overturns the objection based on God's moral authority over us.

3
Reply to (B)-part (U). The literature on the moral significance of privacy
identifies effects which a lack of respect for privacy has on individuals'
ability to develop their capacities for responsible moral agency and for relationships of trust and intimacy. In so far as these capacities are central to
personhood, the literature argues, then respect for privacy is necessary for
meeting our moral obligation to respect persons. In this part of section (3)
we use insights from this literature to show that in order to become responsible moral agents and trusting, loving persons, we need to be able to count
on our fellow human beings to respect our privacy, i.e., to show prima facie
regard for our desire not to reveal ourselves in particular ways in particular
circumstances to particular or all fellow humans. In (B)-part (iii) we investigate to what extent this conclusion also extends to relationships with the
divine.
Responsible agents must first and foremost be capable of holding themselves accountable for doing what is right and good; they must recognize
others as having moral claims against them and themselves as having moral
claims against others. This complex ability requires a certain conception of
the self, a conception of the self with which we are not born and do not
necessarily develop or maintain. If forever treated as mere dependents, slaves
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or tools of other humans' will and satisfaction, it is extremely difficult to
think of ourselves as responsible agents or as people who can rightfully
demand that certain things not be done to us or to others.
Of course, coercion or general disregard for a person's preferences-in the
absence of morally sufficient reasons for doing so-is a form of treating that
person as our tool and, for the moment at least, as our "slave" and not as a
rightfully independent self, or person. But this is the case to an extraordinary
degree when the choice ignored or overridden is the individual's choice to
maintain privacy. For by violating (for no moral reason) his claim against our
intrusion into what he took to be uniquely his domain, we deny that he is his
own person, possessing a special relationship to his own thoughts, feelings
or personal history.
It is for this reason that Jeffrey Reiman has correctly spoken of respect for
privacy as a "social ritual by means of which an individual's moral title to
his existence is conferred. "7 Reiman writes that "moral ownership in the full
sense requires the social ritual of privacy" because a sense of moral entitlement to oneself does not develop unless we are treated as uniquely "entitled
to determine when and by whom [our] concrete reality is experienced," when
and to whom the "contents of [our] consciousness" are revealed, and respect
for privacy simply is this practice of treating individuals as uniquely entitled
in just this way.8
Without participating in a social setting which acknowledges a moral claim
to privacy, the individual cannot come to see herself as the moral proprietor
and governor of her body, thoughts, feelings, and decisions, and therefore she
will not learn to be responsible for them nor to claim moral respect for them.
She will not, that is, conceive of herself as the sort of being who can hold
herself and others morally accountable.
Besides having this ability for accountability, responsible moral agents
must know what it is to seek and do the good because, upon moral reflection,
they themselves judge it to be good. To develop this moral talent likewise
requires a private sphere in which we can practice thinking for ourselves. If every
piece of moral reflection were immediately reviewed by those whose approval
we desire or condemnation we fear, very few of us would learn to evaluate ideas
or actions according to any standard other than what is useful or agreeable. As
Edward Bloustein affinns, without relief from public scrutiny of thoughts and
deeds, one's "opinions, being public, tend never to be different; [one's] aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones. "9
Probably no other capacities are as fundamental to moral agency as the
ability to hold oneself and others accountable and the ability to do the good
because one has oneself judged it good. But out of these capacities grow other
abilities for relationships proper to mature moral agents. Trust and intimacy
seem particularly to require human respect for privacy.
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Speaking very generally, we can say that trusting someone always involves
the conviction that she will follow through with some piece of behavior (in
thought or deed) which we have tacitly or explicitly asked of her, or which
we have given her some reason to think she should do in relation to us. Note
that we can correctly be said to have trusted someone to perform a particular
act right before our eyes as when, for example, we trust a conversation partner
not to lie to us. We also can correctly be said to trust someone whose actions
we do not observe as when, for example, we trust a friend not to reveal our
vulnerabilities to those who wish us ill-will. But trusting someone nonetheless means that we anticipate their carrying through with the behavior,
whether or not we are able to detect and to hold them accountable for a breach
of our trust. If, therefore, we say that we trust our friend not to aid those who
wish us ill but we nonetheless insist on monitoring her every conversation,
the friend could rightly complain that we do not trust her after all.
Trusting, then, always involves the conviction that the person will act the
way we have agreed (tacitly or explicitly) he will act in relation to us regardless of whether we are present to enforce our agreement. This being the case,
to become worthy of trust we must become the sort of person who can do
what we have agreed to do whether or not someone is there to see that we
do it "or else." Now, as Charles Fried. has pointed out, someone who knows
he is under constant surveillance never has the opportunity to discover
whether he is in fact trustworthy in this way. Having always had the presence
of the authority to keep him in line, he never learns the discipline nor knows
he is capable of gaining the discipline to perform his duty when no one is
watching. As a consequence, surmises Fried, he also cannot learn to trust
others. For if he has never experienced being worthy of another's trust he has
no basis for thinking others are worthy of his. to Without trust, of course,
intimacy is also impossible.
There are also more direct connections between respect for privacy and the
ability for intimate friendships. Imagine either a world in which all automatically know each others' histories, thoughts and feelings or one in which each
has a right to know such about the other. Either imagined world seems to us
devoid of the possibility of intimate relationships anything like the sort we
know in the world as we have it. We draw this conclusion from observations
of what appear to be fundamental components of intimacy as humans partake
of it.
Our primary observation is that intimacy seems always to involve at its
core a mutual voluntary gift of self. Yet, I can give myself to another only if
I have a self to give; that is, if I do not first recognize myself as responsibly
and rightfully independent of the other, then I cannot conceive of myself as
freely offering myself to the other. And as we noted above, the development
and maintenance of such a sense of self requires a social structure which
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recognizes a right to privacy. The significance of this background right also
lies in this: the beloved's gift of self by disclosure of personal facts and
private thoughts comes to one as something to which one has no initial right;
yet this is impossible if our social setting does not recognize a general right
to limit access to personal information.
Of course, the gift of self may take forms other than intentional self-disclosure. Yet, a crucial form in which it is expressed is the voluntary disclosure
and exchange of stories about who we are, have been and hope to be. No
doubt this is in part because intimate relationships are relationships of
choice-we want and choose to be known by the other. But note that this is
not all that is operating in the significance of voluntary disclosure. For it does
not seem to be enough to have retrospective choice, that is, to be glad that
our friend knows what others told her. Intimacy appears to occur and flourish
in the telling of what the other recognizes as ours and ours alone to tell-a
situation, it should be noted, which makes our gift of self really a creation
of self in the telling of who we understand ourselves to have been and be.
The worlds without privacy which we asked the reader to imagine would
make such a point of view impossible. Therefore, without denying that confession of what one knows the other already knows can be charged with
significance and spur intimacy, we conclude that the features we have described and which we locate at the core of the human experience of intimacy
require the possibility of privacy.ll
If the above analyses and observations are correct, then at least among
fellow human beings, respect for privacy is one of the conditions necessary
for the possibility of becoming responsible moral agents capable of trusting
and intimate relationships. God, we are assuming, asks that we become responsible and loving agents. Is divine respect for privacy also necessary for
attaining this end? If we fail to act towards God as a creator who respects
our autonomy and privacy, can we achieve this end of mature moral and
personal development which we assume God wants and asks us to become?
Reply to (B)-part (iii). Without presuming to settle this question indefeasibly, we will build a strong case for the affirmative by digging out what is at
stake in the God-human relationship regarding each of the above discussed
aspects of mature moral agency. We take them in reverse order.
Intimacy. We have said that fundamental features of intimacy among humans depend upon our having the right and opportunity to withhold information about ourselves. God's knowing all that is true about us would not
deprive us of the opportunity for spontaneous, fresh self-revelation to a fellow
human. 12 Would relating to God as One who knows innermost thoughts without our telling and against our will prevent intimacy with God? We argued
above that our capacity for intimacy requires also a capacity for trust and a
sense of responsible selfhood and that both of these are linked to our fellow

378

Faith and Philosophy

humans' respect for privacy. Thus, a full discussion of intimacy and God
awaits our discussion of these other aspects of mature moral agency. But it
is worth our while to consider what consequences for intimacy with God
follow from the other features of human intimacy examined above.
We argued that fundamental components of the experience of human intimacy require privacy because it allows a voluntary, self-determined giving
of one's historical, psychological and philosophical story. It follows from this
that if confessing before God what God already knows is all that is possible,
then intimacy with God of a sort comparable to what we know through human
interaction is not possible. Might our relationship with God still be called
"intimate"? Perhaps in a very attenuated application of the term, yes. But as
long as our relationship to God lacks truly free and self-determining self-disclosure, then the sense in which that relationship is "intimate" has only a
rather distant analogy to what that term means when we apply it to our
experience with one another.
Thus, while our analysis of intimacy, self-disclosure, and privacy does not
show that intimacy with God is conceptually impossible unless we conceive
of God as respecting our privacy, we believe it does show that if there is
intimacy with a non-self-limiting omniscient God, it is intimacy of a different
order than that known through human interaction. Anyone wishing to argue
for the view that humans can achieve intimacy with a God who does not
respect privacy needs to give an account of what characterizes this intimacy
and what qualifies it as such in the absence of a quality that functions so
crucially in human intimacy, namely voluntary self-disclosure. And even if
this can be done, such an account must also deal with whether and how human
intimacy can be a place for growing into a quite different kind of intimacy
with God, since theists often assume that the one is preparation for the other.
Trust. Intimacy, we said earlier, is inconceivable without trust. Regarding
trust we have said that people learn to be worthy of trust by being trusted
such that they develop the self-mastery to act as they have been asked to act,
even though those who trust them would never know of their betrayal. If we
act towards God as the moral author and judge who "sees" and "hears" all
things, then it would seem impossible for us to learn either that God trusts
us or that we are worthy of God's trust. To become worthy of trust I must be
able to recognize my situation as one in which I have been trusted. If we
think God observes our every thought, then we do not know that God has
ever trusted us or that we have ever met the test of God's trust.
It might be argued against us that God does not need to be able to trust
humans since God need never be absent. That is, perhaps trust is a virtue only
among finite creatures. This defense of omniscience, however, takes the disanalogy between human interaction and our interaction with God a further
and even more problematic step. As did the defense of intimacy with God
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without privacy, this dismissal of divine trust raises the query how our human
relationships can teach us about love of God. Even more perplexing, however,
is the obscurity it casts on how God's treatment of us can be a model for our
treatment of fellow humans. To say that trust is a virtue only among the
spatio-temporally limited, or that God's omnipresence rather than trust is the
appropriate model for relationships, suggests that improved use of surveillance techniques is as morally worthy a strategy as nurturing trust-a particularly dubious conclusion if we wish to affirm trust in God's love as a
fundamental religious virtue.
Independent thought. Undergirding trust as trust undergirded intimacy is
our ability to think, decide and act independently of pressures, threats and
goads; that is, the ability to make our own reasoned judgment about what is
good and to do that which we judge good because we do so judge it. We said
above that human influences and temptations are such that to develop this
nascent ability most of us need an opportunity away from others' observation
and judgment. We need human respect for our privacy in order to value and
encourage within ourselves autonomous moral reflection. Is this true in our
relationship with God as well? A strong reason for answering in the affirmative is that independent moral thought that leaves no stone unturned must
conceive the possibility that even the most repugnant ideas are true. This
suggests that what is finally unthinkable before God must be open to exploration, and consideration of the unthinkable is bound to come more easily
under a conception of God as listening only when asked.
A possible response to this argument might be that the required openness
to considering repulsive ideas might flourish just as well under a conception
of God as an omniscient but forgiving moral judge who values our process
of reasoning as much as right conclusions. Such a God could be trusted to
tolerate-maybe appreciate, maybe even enjoy-mistakes and repugnancies
in the effort to think creatively, honestly, thoroughly and clearly. If we act
towards God as One who has at least this kind of desire and respect for our
autonomy, perhaps we need not also view God as respecting the privacy of
our reasoning for the sake of this third aspect of mature moral agency. But
then the puzzle is this: if God values our process of reasoning and is wholly
prepared to forgive us when we err, why would God monitor it in the first
place?
Our position regarding this third aspect of moral agency then, is that there
is an originally strong argument that a God who intends us to become agents
capable of independent moral reflection will not monitor our every belief.
This argument appears initially to be offset by the view of God as One who
highly values our normative and intellectual search and who is both immensely tolerant and well-prepared to forgive. This rebuttal we believe does
show convincingly that God need not respect privacy in order to allow us to
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become independent thinkers, but at the same time it undercuts a major reason
we might otherwise have for maintaining that God does monitor our thoughts
and beliefs without our consent. This is because, if we believe that God so
desires and values our process of autonomous reflection that mistakes and
repugnancies are morally inconsequential before God, then what reason do
we further have for thinking God would monitor our thoughts without invitation? Although God could respect our independent judgment and not our
privacy, if God does respect our independent judgment then the reason for
God not to respect our privacy is obscure.
A morally accountable self. Above we said that being the experiencer of
particular thoughts and feelings is not sufficient for understanding the contents of one's consciousness as belonging to one in a moral sense. In order
to think of myself as responsible for what I think, feel, and do, and in order
to think of my thoughts, feelings, and decisions as worthy of others' moral
respect, I must view the contents of my consciousness as something which I
uniquely own and govern. This ownership of self is known in the power to
exert control over others' access to my consciousness, and this is possible
only where rituals of respect for privacy are generally accepted. The major
question for us, then, is whether God's lack of a prima facie regard for privacy
would likewise deprive us of the opportunity of growing into a sense of moral
self-ownership.
Let us imagine being aware from our earliest moment that God is "listening" to our unvoiced speculations and day dreams, whether or not we consent
to that divine presence. This would be to live in full and unbroken acknowledgement that our private mulIings may be unwanted performances and,
therefore, that the content of our consciousness is not uniquely ours. By right
of access, it belongs as well to an Other. As a result, the sense of unique
responsibility for one's thoughts which one might otherwise develop is severely attenuated; the opportunity to take possession of oneself, so to speak,
is nullified. It is very doubtful that out of such a weakened sense of responsibility or self-possession there could come an agent who accepts full responsibility for her beliefs and actions and recognizes fellow humans as likewise
accountable. Furthermore, we have said above that this sense of responsible
selfhood undergirds our ability to act upon autonomous moral reflection, to
trust and be trustworthy, and to enter intimate relationships. Therefore, the
significant doubt cast upon our ability to become selves if God does not
respect our privacy strengthens our case that these other abilities require
privacy before God.
Our conclusion regarding selfhood and divine respect for privacy has been
derived by imagining what it would be like to always live as if God "heard"
all, whether we consented or not. To this conclusion it could be objected that
this is not the actual situation in which we find ourselves. The typical sin-
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ner-that is, almost anyone of us-lives as though God is not present, even
if God does not respect her privacy. Thus, isn't it enough, the challenge would
go, that God has made us such that we can ignore God's presence and complete knowledge of us; for by allowing us an illusion of privacy, God provides
the condition we need to develop a sense of autonomous selfhood.
A little reflection shows, we think, that this proposed rebuttal to our position describes a situation God could not bring about. For on this hypothesis
it follows that the person who is ignorant of God's knowledge of the private,
or who has the false belief that God does not have such knowledge, is in a
position to fulfill God's purpose and command to attain autonomous selfhood,
while one with knowledge of the truth is not. But, surely, a morally perfect
being would not make it the case that knowledge of the truth would prevent
fulfillment of that being's purpose for us.
Note well that our objection is to conceiving God as offering us no choice
regarding self-disclosure and not against striving for the spiritual depth to
place heart and mind constantly before God. A responsible self's voluntary
decision to welcome God into every moment of his thinking is not only
conceptually possible, it is perhaps the highest ideal of the religious life. Far
from detracting from this traditional ideal our argument underscores it. This is
so because once one conceives of God as One who respects privacy, the choice
to share one's innermost self with God becomes more significant than ever.
Reply to (B)-summary. In this section we examined, by comparison with
human disregard for privacy, the detrimental effects which divine disregard
for privacy can be expected to have on our ability to become the sort of beings
who have a sense of the moral accountability for ourselves and others and
who can enter relationships of trust and intimacy. We have concluded that,
despite a degree of difference between the experience and development of
these capacities in interaction with humans and their experience and development in interaction with God, the balance of considerations falls on the
side of a need for divine respect for privacy. Therefore, in so far as we
conceive of God as wanting and commanding us to become mature moral
agents, we must think of God as having a prima facie moral regard for our
privacy. This is the case even if, as objection (B) claims, the authority God
possesses as creator would initially seem to alleviate God of any responsibility
to respect our autonomy. The God who has not merely created us, but specifically
created us for mature moral agency and has commanded us to fulfill that purpose,
could not morally make it impossible for us to fulfill that commandment.
4

Reply to (C). A third way of defeating the claim that God ought to respect
our privacy and/or will do so as a condition of realizing the divine purpose
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for us is to mount an overriding case for divine omniscience not limited in
the way we propose.
The obvious conceptual consideration in this regard is God's perfection and
worthiness for worship. Knowledge is a great-making quality and God necessarily possesses the maximal instance of it. Thus, to our proposal, one might
object that an individual ignorant of our private concerns cannot be God, and
cannot, therefore, be that perfect being who alone is worthy of worship. Our
response is equally obvious. Surely the judgment about maximal perfection
is an overall one, a jUdgment which takes account of all the attributes of a
perfect being. And if perfect goodness dictates that there are things such a
being could know if it were morally appropriate, but necessarily will not
know if it is wrong to do so, then the scope of omniscience will be consistent
with divine goodness. 13
Nor do we think we have impugned the majesty and worshipfulness of God
by setting limits to divine omniscience. A being who fails to show respect
where respect is due is neither majestic nor worthy of worship. It would
seem that the burden of proof rests with our position, but if it has been
persuasively argued, then it represents no threat to the majesty and
worshipfulness of God.
A second kind of objection in an overriding case against divine respect for
privacy concerns features of God's overall purpose for us with which we
agree and which, on the face of it, require divine knowledge of the private
sphere of our life. Traditionally, God is providentially active in forming our
characters and will judge the outcome with perfect justice. But how can God
do the former without error unless God knows fully what we are like and thus
what effect on our character events are likely to have? And how can God
judge with perfect justice and yet fail to have all relevant information about
us?
These matters are not, of course, easy to decide. Our answers to both have
a similar form. Surely, among the effects of events upon us with which God
is concerned will be that of how uninvited divine knowledge of us affects our
moral development and our capacity for trust and intimacy. Assuming that
these things are central to God's purpose for us and that our reasoning about
the role of privacy in their development is correct, then God will providentially interact with us accordingly, guided by an errorless but self-limited
knowledge.
Similarly with God's judgment. We have argued that divine respect for
privacy is plausibly a necessary condition of our development as moral
agents. God cannot hold us accountable while violating the conditions which
make possible our capacity for moral responsibility. Whatever the mode of
God's perfect justice, it must be consistent with the conditions necessary for
holding us accountable in the first place. 14
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Finally there are matters of religious practice, as well as psychological and
religious considerations, which seem at first to weigh against the view of God
we are proposing. The most important, perhaps, is that among human desires
arguably the deepest and most religiously significant is the desire for unconditional acceptance. But does not God's unconditional love require the belief
that God knows all there is to know about us? Our response is that belief in
God's unconditional love is a conviction to be held with absolute trust, and
if we cannot realize our capacity for trust apart from divine respect for
privacy, then God will not undercut the condition required to develop that
capacity. We show our trust in the divine promise of unconditional love
precisely in revealing to God those matters we deem private.
In this connection, we should underscore a point made above, namely, that
on the view we propose the highest ideal of the religious life might be seen
as the responsible self's free choice of God's presence in every moment of
her thinking. It might be argued, to the contrary, that the religious life's ideal
of complete self-knowledge before God could only be formulated and motivated by recognizing that we are already known perfectly by God. God's
perfect knowledge of us, on this alternative view, would serve as a continuous
invitation and challenge to overcome our fragmentary and distorted selfknowledge. The ideal is to come to know ourselves as we are known by God.
This alternative ideal is plausible. However, it overlooks the fact that in
matters of privacy, our struggle is over whether we will reveal to others what
we know, or think we know, about ourselves. In developing intimate human
relationships, our struggle for self-knowledge is focussed on the choice of
what we will and will not disclose to the other. Why do we hide (or reveal)
this fact about ourselves and not that one? Surely the drama and significance
which such choices hold for self-knowledge would be heightened all the more
in the presence of an Other whom we trust to love us unconditionally.
Indeed, we suggest that there is much in this view which is religiously
attractive. A conception of God's relationship to us which makes a virtue of
human autonomy and dignity is, to modems at least, bound to seem preferable
to one which requires compromise of a cherished value. The ancient conundrum associated with prayer-why pray when God knows already the secrets
of our hearts?-is dispelled with the view that, in part, prayer is genuine
disclosure of that which God would not otherwise know. And a theology
which can argue analogously from interpersonal matters, knowledge about
which we have confidence, to the character of our relationship to a personal
God, is to be preferred, we think, to an austere agnosticism which leaves
religious belief and practice shrouded in obscurity.

5
The idea of God as one who respects our privacy, we realize, does not fit
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well with theistic tradition and its devotional practice. As we have reflected
on the matter, however, we have come to think that a strong case can be made
for thinking about God in this way, a way which is religiously attractive in
a culture which values human autonomy. We have not considered the possibility that God who is obliged or will benevolently choose to respect our
privacy will have overriding reasons to know us completely. Such consideration would require a separate essay. But if our reasoning is sound about the
connection between privacy and moral accountability, such morally overriding reasons would have to be strong indeed. A God who does not override
our significant freedom to do great harm to ourselves and one another seems
unlikely to violate our privacy in the name of some greater good.

Hendrix College,
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NOTES
1. Debate centers on God's knowledge of possibility and future contingents. See, for
example, Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1986).

2. Richard Creel has argued recently that God has created persons to exercise significant
choice for God's kingdom and not its alternative, rather than "to choose him." We disagree,
but a minimalist account of divine purpose like Creel's still involves trust in God and we
argue below that the development of such trust in God and we argue below that the
development of such trust requires divine respect for human privacy. For Creel's reflections on divine purpose, see Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chapter 8 and passim.
3. For the attack on this idea, see Marilyn McCord Adams, "Problems of Evil: More
Advice to Christian Philosophers," Faith and Philosophy, volume 5, number 2 (April
1988), pp. 121-43.
4. The "duty" model is discussed and defended by Thomas V. Morris, "Duty and Divine
Goodness," The Concept of God (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 107-21.
5. The best of the substantial literature on privacy is collected in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, ed. Ferdinand David Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), cited below as Schoeman. In our depiction of privacy as primarily
a matter of control, we have taken issue with Mr. Schoeman and sided with Charles Fried.
See Schoeman, p. 3, and Fried, "Privacy [a moral analysis]," p. 209, both in Schoeman.
6. A Kantian argument to the contrary could be modeled on that school's standard
justifications of punishment. The sate, it is argued, can punish under certain specifiable
conditions because having a state that punishes under those conditions is what the
individual would will were she willing rationally. Similarly one could argue that human
individuals willing rationally would will that the all-good divine being knows their every
thought, word, and deed. Therefore, God is morally justified in not respecting privacy.
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Note two things about this argument, however. One, the claim that it is rational to will
that God know all about us must be defended. Two, does this argument itself not assume
a prima facie obligation on the part of God to respect privacy?
7. Jeffrey Reiman, "Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood," in Schoeman, p. 310.
8. Reiman, p. 313.
9. Edward J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an aspect of human dignity: an answer to Dean
Prosser," in Schoeman, p. 188. For further supporting reflections see Stanley, I Benn,
"Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons," in Schoeman, pp. 241,242.
10. Fried, pp. 208-9 and 216-7. In fairness we should note that Fried works from a
slightly different description of "trust".
11. Yet, intimacy is profoundly experienced on those occasions when our beloved seems
to have grasped who we are better than we ourselves. With more time and space we would
argue that this effect of "being known" depends in large measure on a background
assumption about the private and privileged nature of self-disclosure.
12. A final relevant effect of a world of no privacy would be that all our relationships
would be carried out before third parties. This, notes Robert Gerstein, would deprive all
friendships of a necessary quality of intimacy: that the relationship is valued for its own
sake. Having a third party overtly observing them forces the couple's attention away from
the inherent meaning of their act and towards how they appear to another. As a result the
intimate quality of the act dissipates as the measure of the activity's worth becomes its
usefulness in front of the observer. However, God's presences in all that we do with the
beloved does place us in the position of always having to take into account how what we
do appears before God and what value it must have from the divine perspective. According
to the analysis above, this concern destroys intimacy unless it can coincide with valuing
the relationship for its own sake in a way that worrying over how we appear before human
observers cannot. Perhaps this coincidence can take place if the intimate partners choose
truly to place their relationship before the Creator's eyes. Otherwise, it is not obvious it
can. See Robert Gerstein, "Intimacy and Privacy," in Schoeman, p. 268.
13. It might be thought that our view entails the absurd consequence that God knows
practically nothing about us or, even worse, the contradictory view that God must first
know all our thoughts in order to know which ones we choose to keep private. But we do
not accept either charge. As for the first, just as we know or have reasonable beliefs about
other human beings based on astute observation of them and attention to what they
inadvertently reveal, so God would have the perfect knowledge of each of us in this mode.
Furthermore, God would appropriately have omniscient access to all our personal life,
except for those things about which we choose to remain private. Intuitively, this seems
quite ample enough knowledge of us to enable God to interact with us in such a way that
we could come to choose to reveal everything about ourselves. After all, we manage as
human beings to interact with one another in such a way as to choose and achieve
profoundly intimate relationships with one another. On the second point, as to how God
could know what we deem private without first knowing all our thoughts, why should we
accept this as the only possible account of the mechanism for divine knowledge? Why
could not God's will from all eternity be determined not to know what we choose to keep
private? Richard Creel's model of God's will as indexed to possibility is a useful one to
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envision as a mechanism by which God could respect our privacy. See Creel, op. cit.,
chapter 2.
14. It may be that the mechanism of divine justice which fits best with our proposal is
the notion of self-judgment found in the writings of C.S. Lewis. The unwillingness of the
self to open itself to God consigns the self to a life apart from the divine presence with
the deserved quality of life which that entails. For Lewis' imaginative portrayal of his
view, see The Great Divorce, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1946).
15. We are grateful to Jonathan Stewart, David Hawkins, William P. Alston and two
anonymous reviewers for helpful criticisms and suggestions.

